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7 Aug

Excerpt from Minutes of President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Meeting on 7 August 1964

"6. Mr. McCone then turned to the organization of effort for science and technology inside the CIA and noted that this was basically for supporting the National Reconnaissance Program. He read the subjects which the Board wished him to cover in this regard and noted that on 8 March 1963 the Board had made recommendations to the Agency for the organization of its science and technological effort and that what we had today was in fulfillment of those recommendations. He read through the several recommendations on that subject made by the Board. Turning to the organization chart, he showed the Board first the organization of DD/R as it had been a little over a year ago and then turned to the organization of DD/S&T as it is today. He went through the organization chart unit by unit describing what it did. Of the Hyland Panel he noted that it had been in existence for 11 years reviewing the intelligence available on Soviet missiles and checking the intelligence that had been produced on this subject. He said that they had made their most recent report last Monday and had told him that if they had applied a unit of "1" to the quality of the scientific and technical intelligence in CIA 10 or 11 years ago, they would have evaluated it at "25" two years ago and "100" last week. He said that he thought the Board should note this as an indication of the increase in quality in this area in CIA. In commenting on the Special Projects Staff, Mr. McCone noted that this staff, which only has a few people today, would be that staff to support FULCRUM should it be decided to go ahead with that project. He noted that FMSAC, created last year in CIA, resulted in the creation of a similar organization in DIA. He said that he mentioned this not in criticism but because he thought it was wise to have two organizations working on material that was hard to interpret. Mr. McCone then advised the Board that he had a notebook with him with the biographic sketches of 50 scientific and technical personnel who had been brought into the Agency in the last few years and who possessed a high degree of competence. He said that of this group there were 15 PhD's.

"7. Mr. Gray noted that when the DCI proposed to move OSI out of DD/I there was resistance. Mr. McCone acknowledged this and said that he had waited a year after this move was first proposed and then made it. He noted that there was always resistance to organizational changes, but that he was convinced that it was the thing to do. He

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went on to note that the DD/S&T was a good structure to support any program of reconnaissance; that reconnaissance systems always grow and are improved as a result of experience, and that he was convinced that the best method was to maintain the system in the organization that created it in order to obtain marked improvement as a result of the experience gained by the engineers who created the system....

"9. Mr. McCone then noted that he had gone through the DD/S&T organization in order to show the Board that as a result of their recommendations he had developed a substantial but not excessive organization to support the National Reconnaissance Program. He said that it should be obvious to the Board that this organization would have to play a part in the NRP in order to keep these highly qualified and able people in the Government. He said that every time he brought consultants in from industry he could see them looking over our people to see the ones they would like to grab at higher salaries. Mr. McCone noted that there were [redacted]

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[redacted] In 1965 CIA will receive [redacted] from the NRO for the projects assigned to CIA, with the majority of this amount for OXCART.

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"10. As far as the future of the CIA program supporting NRO, he didn't know how many systems would evolve but there were several which were being actively considered at the present time. He noted that FULCRUM was the development of a new search satellite as a carry-on for CORONA and that there had been no effort toward development of a search satellite in the Pentagon until CIA proposed FULCRUM. He said that this might cost [redacted] to find out if it was feasible and then would go up [redacted] annually if it should be adopted to replace CORONA. [redacted]

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Mr. McCone said that these were systems which had been developed for intelligence purposes and were not duplicating any other effort in the Government.

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"11. Mr. McCone said that he would be less than frank if he didn't tell the Board that the mere creation of this capability for S&T operations had created a problem and that the Board might have to render a judgment as to whether this was needed in the CIA. He noted that when CIA created the DD/S&T, the DIA also created an Assistant Director for S&T, and that when CIA created FMSAC, DIA also created a similar organization. He said that the NRO problems with which the Board was fairly familiar were no better than they had been. At this point Dr. Land said that he and Dr. Langer had to leave and that it appeared to him that the CIA had intruded in many areas in which there was danger of duplicating but that perhaps this duplication was wise from the Government point of view. (He and Mr. McCone then exchanged comments on Dr. Wheelon going to Cambridge on Monday to meet with Dr. Land, Dr. Brockway McMillan and others.)

"12. Mr. Clifford said the Board would watch this problem quite closely. Mr. McCone noted that he wouldn't be able to keep competent and qualified people in the climate that evolves from interagency friction. He said that the climate of trying to sabotage CIA operations which had developed and which he had outlined was one in which the Air Force had come to contractors saying, "We are going to get the g-d CIA out of it, and don't deal with it." He noted that CIA had developed FULCRUM while NRO had done nothing, and the fact that CIA had proposed it was deeply resented. He said, "The performance in this area is an utter and absolute disgrace. That's my feeling about it."

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